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PowERS RrnHTs OF DoNEEs' CREDITORS AGAINST PROPERTY
SUBJECT THERETO WHEN THE POWER IS GENERAL AND IS EXERCISED
BY WILL In general it is said that the majority of jurisdictions in

the United States allow creditors of the donee of a general power of
appointment, exercisable by deed or will, or by will only, to reach the
appointive property when the power is exercised by will, if the donee's
personal estate is insolvent and if the appointment is to a volunteer.1
It would appear from a survey of the authorities dealing with the
question that only twenty states have spoken on the subject at all. 2 Of

1 49 C. J. u76 (1930); 21 R. C. L. 785 (1918); 59 A. L. R. 1513 (1929);
L. R. A. 1918D 346; 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 329 (1940) (see also 330, as
to where power exercised inter vivos); SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 265 (1936);
77 UNIV. PA, L. REv. 422 (1929).
2 These jurisdictions are: Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Ver~
mont and Virginia.

MICHIGAN LAW

REVIEW

that number only sixteen have decisions which can, by any stretch of the
imagination, be considered in point.3 Ten states of the sixteen have
qllowed creditors to satisfy their claims from such property without
adding· any further requirements.4 Two more have conceded that an
appointment might affirmatively be made for creditors.5 And one of
these has held it is enough, even, if the donee sufficiently treats the
appointive property as his own.6 But then, once the fundamental con·cept of a general power is adopted, there is certainly no logical reason
why appointments in fact for creditors or subject to the donee's debts
should not bC? allowed, nor why an appointment to his own estate should .
not be inferred from his sufficiently treating the property as a part
thereof. Only six states may conceivably be considered to have held
that insolvency plus a testamentary appointment to volunteers are not
enough.7
'
The purpose of this paper is to analyze authorities representative
of extreme points of view. The discussion does not undertake to include
within its scope the particular problems raised by the exercise of a power
inter vivos, nor by the exercise or nonexercise of a reserved power, nor
does it deal with the question of what will in fact constitute, an exercise
of a power, except as the answer to such question is directly determinative of the rights of creditors, and, lastly, it is not concerned with the
particular· effect upon creditors' rights of express legislation, either
state or federal. Decisions from those states which are most liberal in
allowing creditors' claims are considered first. Then are considered
those whose only indications of attitude are in dicta._ And finally are
taken up decisions from those jurisdictions which have been most strict
in their recognition of creditors' claims.
I.

11). 1879 Massachusetts first stated the rule that creditors of the
donee of a general testamentary power can reach the appointive property when the power is exercised and the donee's estate is insolvent.8
The appointment, however, was to the donee's executor, with directions
3 The four of the twenty (see note z, supra) which do not have anything in point
are: Connecticut, Illinois, Texas and Vermont.
4 These ten are: Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina and Virginia.
5 These are: Pennsylvania and Kentucky.
6 See section on Pennsyhi:ania, with reference to "blending."
7 These six are: Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and
South Carolina.
8 Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. zoo ( I 879). The appointment was to the takers
in default. The question of presuming renouncement by them was not considered.
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to keep $400 for himself and to distribute the rest to the donee's chil-·
dren. This might ~ave been held an appointment to the donee's estate,
which might, logically at least, have been found an express appointment
subject to the claims of donee's creditors. In the following year, however, an appointment to a trustee for the benefit of one creditor was
held to subject the appointed property to the claims of all of the donee's
creditors.0 On the theory that the mere appointment was consideration
for his debt, the case appears to hold that the appointee is a mere volunteer and can take only what remains after the general creditors'
claims are satisfied. Any doubt on this point was subsequently removed
by a later case holding that an insolvent donee's testamentary appointment to one creditor subjects the appointed property to the claims of all
creditors.10 The appointee, as such, is a volunteer. He can, however,
also claim as a creditor, and is thus no worse ( and possibly better) off
than if he had never been made an appointee.11 A surety, even, cannot
reach, by subrogation, the appointed property ahead of creditors, and
he is still liable to the assured for the amount of his claim by which the
estate is insolvent.11 Where the donee induced a loan by a representation of having exercised by will a general testamentary power in favor
of the lender, and then died intestate, his heirs, taking from the donor's
estate by default provision, were not estopped as against the claims of
the donee's creditors (including the lender so induced) .18 Failure to
exercise the power is fatal to the claims of creditors against the appointive property, even though the donee's estate be insolvent. A general
direction to pay debts is not sufficient manifestation of intent to appoint
subject to the claims of creditors even in a case where the power is exercised further on in the testamentary instrument.14 The creditors still
take against the will, and only to the extent the appointed property is
not used to pay debts is it subject to an inheritance tax. It appears,
however, from dicta in Vinton v. Pratt 15 that when an inter vivos contract is made to exercise a testamentary power by will in favor of the
•promisee, damages for breach in nonperformance may be claimed
against the donee's estate, although specific performance will be denied and although if the appointment had been so made it would have
O'Donnell v. Barbey, 129 Mass. 453 (1880).
Harmon v. Weston, 215 Mass. 242, 102 N. E. 470 (1913).
11 Vinton v. Pratt, 228 Mass. 468, 117 N. E. 919 (1917). The appointment
appears here to be expressly subject to creditors' claims.
12 Harmon v. Weston, 215 Mass. 242, I02 N. E. 470 (1913).
18 Montague v. Silsbee, 218 Mass. ro7, I05 N. E. 61 I (1914). It was argued
that one heir even joined the donee in this representation, and yet the court said this
would not estop him from proving its subsequent revocation.
14 Hill v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 229 Mass. 474, 118 N. E. 891 (1918).
15 228 Mass. 468, 117 N. E. 919 (1917).
9

10
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been subject to the claims of all creditors. The soundness of such a
proposition is obviously questionable.16
,
That property appointed by will is not thereby made assets in the
estate of the donee for all purposes becomes quite clear in view of
holdings that appointed property cannot be used to make up deficiencies
in the donee's legacies when the estate is insufficient, after the payment
of debts, to carry out his provisions therefor.1 7 Nor will the appointed
property bear any of the administrative expense~ except those arising
from the admini!\tration of that property. The personal estate of the
donee, including the- realty therein, must first be sold before the ap- _
pointed property can be reached.18 It is said that the-· case might be
different if the appointment were to the donee's executor, which, if
such were found to make the property expressly assets of the estate,
would dearly be a logical result.10 But in view of Clapp v. Ingraham 20
and Vinton v. Pratt 21 exactly what would constitute such an appointment is uncertain. Further still, the recovery by the administrator
de bonis non of property appointed to a volunteer but misappropriated
by the executor is not "new assets" in the donee's estate such as is sufficient to raise the bar of the statute of limitations and allow subjection
to claims of creditors.22 Although the donee's estate was not shown
insolvent in the case in which this was determined, it is submitted that
solvency could have little bearing in deciding this point. Income from
appointive property which is not consumed by the donee is not property
in the donee's estate, but is appointed property when the power is
exercised, and is treated as such, even though it is in the hands of executors as trustees.23
16 See: 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 340, also § 329, Comment (c) (1940).
,
Directly contra in Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N. E. (2d) 487
(1938).
17 White v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 171 Mass. 84, 50 N. E. 512
(1878); Slayton v. Fitch Home, 293 Mass. 574, 200 N. E. 357 (1936). See also·
Loring v. Wilson, 174 Mass. 132, 54 N. E. 502 (1899), where it was held that a
residuary clause, exercising the power for the benefit of A, which provided that the
appointed property was to be used first to make up any deficiency there might be in a
preceding specific bequest to B, was, because of the estate's insolvency, to be executed
first to meet any claims of creditors unsatisfied after the exhausting of the donee's personal estate, then to fulfill the legacy to B, and lastly, if anything should be left, to give
that remainder to A.
18 T_uell v. Hurley, 206 Mass. 6 5, 91 N. E. IO l 3 ( l 910) ;- also -cases in note 10,
supra.
19 Tuell v. Hurley, 206 Mass. 65, 9r N. E. 1013 •(1910).
20 126 Mass. 200 (1879).
21 228 Mass. 468, II7 N. E. 919 (1917).
22 Shattuck v. Burrage, 229 Mass. 448, II8 N. E. 889 (1918).
23 Slayton v. Fitch Home, 293 Mass. 574, 200 N. E. 357 (1936).
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In O'Donnell v. Barby 24 it was held that the trustee under the
donor's will and not the donee's executor was to administer the appointed property for the donee's creditors, but Olney v. Balch 25 pointed
out that there the executor not only had refused so to administer the
property, but was in addition himself the appointee. For these reasons
it distinguished the O'Donnell case from the usual situation and held
that as a matter of administrative convenience the donee's executor
should take the property, when the claims of his creditors are to be
allowed to reach it, even in preference to the donee's trustees who were
the appointees. The theory is that the "creditors, if there are any, will
present their claims to the executors." Harmon v. Weston 20 affirms
this proposition, as does Hill v. Treasurer and Receiver General.21
The theory on which Massachusetts approaches these problems becomes obvious from the above analysis of its courts' rulings. It is not
surprising to find little attention paid to whether the power is purely
testamentary, or is one exercisable by deed or will, so long as it is in
fact exercised by will. 28 Also consistent with these results is the bald
statement that equity will complete a defective appointment to a purchaser for value, providing no others with superior equities have intervened.20 Equity, as a matter of policy, simply subjects the appointed
property to the claims of creditors rather than allow volunteers to take
in derogation of those claims. The rule is too equitable to be overcome
by technical legal arguments based on strict property laws, or by consideration alone for the i11tent of the donor when he created the power
for the donee. 80 A donor's provision that a general testamentary power
is not to be exercised for creditors is ineffective, and its being exercised
for one or more creditors subjects the property to the claims of all creditors where the donee's estate is insolvent. Such a limitation on a general
testamentary power is void, being inconsistent with such power. But a
spendthrift provision to operate for the life of the donee may be given
full e:ffect.81 On the theory by which a tax statute, providing that
property subject to a general power, even though not exercised, should
be taxable in the estate of the do nee, was held constitutional,82 it
would seem quite possible that the Massachusetts state legislature might
constitutionally provide for subjecting appointive property to the claims
24

129 Mass. 453 (1880).

25 154 Mass. 318, 28 N.E. 258 (1891).
215 Mass. 242, 102 N. E. 470 (1913).
229 Mass. 474,118 N. E. 891 (1918).
28 Tuell v. Hurley, 206 Mass. 65, 91 N. E. 1013 (1910).
29 Coates v. Lunt, 210 Mass. 314, 96 N. E. 685 (19u).
so Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879).
81 State Street Trust Co. v. Kissel, 302 Mass. 328, 19 N. E. (2d) 25 (1939)¥
32 Minot v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 207 Mass. 588, 93 N.
973 (1911).
26

27
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of insolvent donees' creditors, even if the pow~r were not exercised.113
More or less in line with the liberal view toward the rights of
creditors which is represented by Massachusetts case law are the only
cases on record in nine other states. The theories vary greatly, and
recent decisions are usually difficult to find. North Carolina, for example, has only four cases in point, the most recent of which is 1868.34
These old decisions take a very technical approach to the problem and
yet reach a very liberal result. They concede that the property appointed passes directly from the donor to the appointee, wit~out in any
way touching, or passing from, or passing through the donee. Then,
having placed the ·property in the hands of those ,whose interests with
respect to the property are most adverse to the interests of the donee's
'creditors, the old ~orth Carolina courts proceeded to impose upon
the property a trust, and constituted the appointees trustees for the
benefit of the donee's creditcrs. It was thus recognized that the donee's
intent had nothing whatsoever to do with the result. On the other hand,
what authority there is in Iowa 35 and the District of Columbia,36 seems
to imply that the courts of these two jurisdictions will look to see
whether the donee has a sufficient number of the attributes of ownership to warrant treating the property as th~ donee's own. New York
also, in its prestatutory days, indicated an inclination toward this approach.37 But this theory does not take into account a distinction generally made between allowing creditors relief when the power is exercised, and denying such relief when it is not exercised. The New Hampshire refinement at least justifies this distinction, by saying in effect
that the dol).or of a general power in effect offers all the attributes of
ownership, which offer the donee accepts only by exercising the power
given.38 Georgia,39 Delaware,4° New Jersey,41 and Virginia 42 all, like
33 But see Forbes v. Snow, 245 Mass. 85, 140 N. E. 418 (1923), where it was
held that a trustee in bankruptcy could not exercise a power.
34 Smith v. Garey, 22 N. C. 42 (1838); Leigh v. Smith, 38 N. C. 442 (1844);
Rogers v. Hinton, 62 N. C. IOI (1867), petition for rehearing dismissed 63 N. C. So
(1868).
35 Hoskin v. West, 226 Iowa 612, 284 N. W. 809 (1939).
36 Knowles v. Dodge, I Mackey (12 D. C.) 66 (1881); Duncanson v. Manson,
3 App. D. C. 260 (1894).
37 Tallmadge v. Sill, 21 Barb. (N. Y. S. Ct.) 34 (1885). See Cutting v. Cutting,
86 N. Y. 522 (1881), for New York views after its statute.
38 Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N. H. 298 (1844).
39 Patterson v. Lawrence, 83 Ga. 703 (1889); Jackson v. Franklin, 179 Ga.
840, 177 S. E. 731 (1934).
i-0 Security Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Ward, IO Del. Ch. 408, 93 A. 385
(1915).
.
,
41 Crane v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 99 N. J. Eq. 164, 133 A. 205 (1926);
Seward v. Kaufman, Il9 N. J. Eq. 44, 180 A. 857 (1935).
42 Freeman's Admr. v. Butters, 94 Va. 406, 26 S. E. 845 (1897).

·

1942

J

CoMMENTS

295

Massachusetts, see the problem as essentially an equitable problem,one which is simply to be determined on principles of fa~rness to all
concerned. The fundamental proposition here seems to be that if the
donee could have appointed to himself, he will not be allowed, in derogation of his creditors' claims, to appoint elsewhere. In general,
nevertheless, the results obtained by the application of these widely
varying theories are not remarkably inconsistent, in any respect, with
the well-developed line of Massachusetts authority.
2.

Only one case has been decided in Vermont which considers very
seriously the problem under discussion. 48 For the reason that it denied
relief to creditors,-without stating that it recognized the "general
rule" permitting creditors of an insolvent donee to reach property testamentarily appointed by the exercise of a general power,-this- case is
classified separately from those in the preceding section. The basis for
the distinction made by the court here was that the creditors of the
donee had not become such after the power had been created in the
donee. They had thus not acted in reliance on the donee's ability to
appoint to them. The justification for reading into the rule this estoppel
element is uncertain, to say the least. There was certainly no precedent
for so doing in the existing case's,44 and there is really no such logical
explanation, either, as could exist consistently with the proposition that
creditors' claims would ever be recognized. 45 Despite the criticism,
however, it must be admitted that this decision raises an interesting
possibility, and also brings into sharp relief the fact that the basis for
the Massachusetts rule 46 does not involve any particular consideration
of the reasonableness of creditors' actions.
u Wales' Admr. v. Bowdisch's Exr., 61 Vt. 23, 17 A. 1000 (1888) ••
4 ' The early cases never considered the point, and they did not, in fact, even
trouble to point out, ordi~arily, when or how the claimants acquired their status as
creditors.
45 If it is argued that the creditors rely on the mere naked power being in the
donee, it can be answered that, as a practical matter, they would not be likely even
to know of the power's existence at the time of extending credit to him (and this would
also be requiring an extra element of knowledge), and if they did know, they could
not rely on the donee's refraining from exercising it inter vivos to a bona fide purchaser.
On the other hand, if the ratiomµe proffered to support this holding is that the power
(secret or not), in addition to a present possessory interest (which would be notice to
all), is the real basis for the estoppel approach, then it should be pointed out that a
donee would be permitted to exercise a naked general power at any time, in derogation
of creditors, and if such were true, it might well be said that the protection to creditors,
for which the courts were originally striving would itself be destroyed, and the inter
vivos purchase problem is also left unsolved by this approach.
46 For convenience, the proposition that creditors of an insolvent donee may reach
property appointed by will, in the exercise of a general power to appoint by deed or
will, or by will only, is referred to throughout the rest of this discussion as the Massachusetts rule.
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The one Texas case having any bearing on the right of donees'
creditors contains only dicta in favor of the Massachusetts rule plus ari
additional statement raising another unanswered problem.47 It is suggested that equity will come to the aid of a defective appointment,
and perfect it in order to favor the donee's creditors. There are some
dicta from other jurisdictions in support of this proposition,48 and there
are at least two cases in which defective appointments have not been
aided.49 Whatever effect may be given such a principle will depend
upon the balance reached by the court between the rights of unsatisfied creditors on the one hand, and consideration owing to the donor's
intent in relation to the expectations of default takers on the other. If
it be granted that a general power is capable of limitation as fo exercise,
it is submitted that a court should aid appointments which are defective
only in technicalities.50
The few cases to be found in Illinois Gi and Connecticut 52 which
discuss the donees' creditors problem at all contain only general dicta
which show a tendency to favor the Massachusetts rule. They add
nothing to the discussion.

3.
Illustrative of many of those jurisdictions which are least disposed
to recognize the claims of donees' creditors against appointed property
are the Pennsylvania cases on the subject. The first of these is Morris
v. Phaler,5~ decided in 1833. In view of subsequent decisions contrary
to its apparent holding, this case is probably of little value as an authority, though it seems never to have been overruled. The court appears in
this instance to hold that where the donee of a life estate in realty is
given a power to dispose to her heirs and assigns one-half of the proceeds of the sale of such realty after the termination of the life estate,
Arnold v. Southern Pine Lumber Co., 58 Tex. Civ. App. 186, 123 S. W. u62
The holding was that the power was not exercised at all and that the property,
therefore, went directly to the default takers.
48 See Duncanson v. Manson, 3 App. D. C. 260 at 273 (1894); Johnson v. Cushing, 15_N.H. 298 at 308 (1844); Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 250, 13 N.E.
(2d) 487 (1938); Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144 at 149 (1881).
49 Boyce v. Waller, 39 Ky. 478 (1840); Benthan v. Smith, Cheves Eq. (S. C.) 33
{1840).
.
50 Thus an attempt to exercise a power in an entirely different manner or at an
entirely different time should, probably be considered a mere nullity.
61 Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144 (1881); Boyle v. John M. Smyth Co., 248 Ill.
App. 57 (1928); Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N. E. (2d) 487
(1938);-People v. Kaiser, 306 Ill. 313,137 N. E. 826 (1923).
52 McMurtry v. State, III Conn. 594, 151 A. 252 (1930).
58 1 Watt (Pa.) 389 (1833). The theory of this decision might well be, on the
other hand, that where the default taker is either the donee or her heirs, or the heirs
of the donor and she is that heir, then if she has a legal life estate, the estates will
merge and she will have a fee. See Langley v. Conlan, 21:z. Mass. 135, 98 N. E.
1064 (1912), which apparently proposes thiti approach.
47

( I 909).
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the donee has the absolute power of disposal, and since the donee must
have intended to exercise the power by her testamentary provision giving one-fourth of the proceeds of such sale to a creditor, the appointee
takes subject to the claims of all the donee's creditors, her personal
estate being insolvent.
In 1849 Chief Justice Gibson's oft-quoted dictum H appeared,
sharply criticizing the proposition that a donee's creditors may reach
appointed property, on the ground that it disregards the donor's intent
in the disposition of his property, that it is contrary to the property-law
concept of the nature of a donee's interest in appointive or appointed
property, and that it is merely a device to foster credit. The vehemence
of this statement apparently overshadowed the holding of Morris '(}.
Phalsr,111 and grew to be the backbone of the Pennsylvania rule as to
the rights of donees' creditors,-with the result that in 1941 the
Pennsylvania court upheld the exercise of a general testamentary
power in derogation of creditors' claims. 56
There is a certain amount of confusion, however, in the application
of this rule. A statute, providing that under certain circumstances a
general devise or bequest may be construed as an exercise of a general
power, appeared in 1879.51 Its real effect is, to say the least, uncertain,
but it might well have had an indirect influence upon the development
of the doctrine of blending. At any rate a survey of the state's authorities shows a constant attention to the problem of whether or not the
donee has ( 1) manifested an intent to exercise his power in favor of
creditors or subject to their claims~ or (2) so treated the appointive
property that it has become blended with his own estate. 58 If either of
114 Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. St. 277 at 279-281 (1849). The case itself
involves the application of a Pennsylvania collateral inheritance tax provision and a
jurisdictional matter.
115 I Watts (Pa.) 389 (1933).
118 In re Stannert's Estate, 339 Pa. 439, 15 A. (2d) 360 (1941).
67 Act of June 4, 1879, Pa. Pub. Laws (1879), p. 88, § 3, repealed and reenacted June 7, 1917, Pa. Pub. Laws (1917), p. 407, § II.
118 Cases where decisions as to creditors turned chiefly .on the answer to one or
both of these questions: Stokes' Estate, 20 W. N. C. (Pa.) 48 (1887); Homer's
Estate, 4 Pa. C. C. 189 (1887) (uncertain); Fell's Estate, 14 Pa. Dist. 327 (1905);
Fleming's Estate, 219 Pa. 422, 68 A. 960 (1908); Huey's Estate, 17 Pa. Dist. 1030
(1908); Terppe's Estate, 224 Pa. 482, 73 A. 922 (1909); Ruddy's Estate, 236 Pa.
276, 84 A. 909 (1912); In re Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives & Granting
Annuities Account, 264 Pa. 433, 107 A. 840 (1919); Forney's Estate, 280 Pa. 282,
124 A. 424 (1924); Kates' Estate, 282 Pa. 417, 128 A. 97 (1925); Hagen's Estate,
85 Pa. Super. 123 (1925), affirmed 285 Pa. 326, 132 A. 175 (1926); Stannert's
Estate, 339 Pa. 439, 15 A. (2d) 360 (1941).
• Cases where the problem is chiefly in regard to taxation: King's Estate, 14
W. N. C. (Pa.) 77 (1883); Swahy's Appeal, 14 W. N. C. (Pa.) 553 (1884);
Twitchell's Estate, 284 Pa. 135, 130 A. 324 (1925); Valentine's Estate, 297 Pa.
99, 146 A. 453 (1929).
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these is found in the affirmative, the creditors are allowed to reach the
property appointed. But the standards by which such questions are
answered, being essentially matters of construction, are not easyto"ascertain with exactness, nor can it often be definitely determined whether
the decision rests on the answer to the first or second. That the statute
just referred to is considered in this connection is clear. 59 That it does
not act of itself to blend the appointive property with the donee's estate
by affecting the exercise of a power through a general testamentary provision disposing of the donee's own estate has been expressly held. 60
From an analysis of the various cases the only conclusions the writer
has been able to form, as to what the court will look to when the ques.tion of creditors' rights are raised are (I) that a general provision for
the payment of debts followed by a general devolution of all the testator's estate, such as will be construed to exercise any general power of
appointment he may· have, will not be conclusive,61 or may, as in
Fell's Estate,62 be held to show an intention not to subject the appointive estate to the claims of creditors; (2) that where the provision for
the payment of debts fallows the general clause which operates to exercise the power, there is likely to be found a clear manifestation by the
donee-of an intent to subject such property to his debts; 68 (3) that an
appointment which expressly announces an intention to blend in so
many words and in addition to subject the property to debts will be
given effect and the estate will be held to go to the donee's executors
both to pay his debts and for tax purposes; 64 and (4) that more than
anything else it is the donee's intent, from all the circumstances, which
will influence the court.65
Once the question whether or not creditors can establish their
claims against appointed property is decided, the Pennsylvania law
becomes more or less precise. When the appointment is to a taker in
default, and it is decided that it is exercised subject to creditors, there
appears to be no more consideration here of a renunciation by the ap59 For examples see: Homer's Estate, 4 Pa. C. C. 189 (1887); Huddy's Estate,
236 Pa. 276, 84 A. 909 (1912); In re Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and
Granting Annuities Account, 264 Pa. 433, 107 A. 840 (1919).
60 Huddy's Estate, 236 Pa. 276, 84 A. 809 (1912) •.
61 Hagen's Estate, 85 Pa. Super. 123 (1925) affirmed 285 Pa. 326, 132 A. 175
(1926).
62 14 Pa. l?ist. 327 (1905).
63 Homer's Estate, 4 Pa. C. C. l 89 ( I 887); and strong dicta in the general discussion of the subject in Hagen's Estate, 285 Pa. 326 at 331, 132 A. 175 (1926).
64 Fomey's Estate, 280 Pa. 282, 124 A. 424 (1924).
65 Stannert's Estate, 339 Pa. 439, 15 A. (2d) 360 (1941), and_ note .that in
Fleming's Estate, 219 Pa. 422, 68 A. 960 (1908), despite the donor's stringent spendthrift provision, the court decided the case on the donee's intent.
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pointee than there was in Massachusetts. 66 At least no case appears yet
to have either had the point seriously argued, or to have followed the
lead of the federal tax cases and raised a presumption of renunciation. 67
In the ordinary case where the property is appointed by will, and
it is found there is no blending, it will pass directly to the appointee,
so that where a husband elected to take against his wife's will, he was
able to take the benefit of the appointment as well as his full share of
her personal estate by intestacy. 08 But where a husband did not appoint
to his widow, though he did exercise h~s power, the widow electing ·
to take against the will was held unable to take any more I than she
would have got had her husband died intestate. 69 She apparently argued
that if he had blended with his personal estate the appointive estate, it
would be blended for all purposes and she would thus be able to take
her statutory share from the appointed property as well. The court held
that the estates were blended, but that only the donee's creditors could
reach the property because it was appointed for their benefit. In the
first case, however, the donee's estate did not appear insolvent, but
logically in Pennsylvania this should have made no difference whatsoever to the decision, once it was found that the estates were not blended.
Where a blending is found, the property will ordinarily be put in
the hands of the donee's executors for convenience in administration. 70
In such a case it might well be used to make up deficiencies in legacies
resulting from the payment of debts, since if it becomes part of the
donee's estate, it might be held to be such for all purposes consistent
with the will so blending it.1 1.
That Pennsylvania has particularly relaxed the strict application
of property-law concepts _in favor of the rights of creditors does· not
very clearly appear in a general survey of its authorities. In fact there
are occasionally very hard cases, such as Dunglison's Estate,1 2 where the
donee, acting also as trustee of the donor, created liabilities through his
malfeasance in office which his testamentary exercise of the power to
66 Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879); Terppe's Estate, 224 Pa. 482,
73 A. 922 (1909); In re Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting
Annuities Account, 264 Pa. 433, 107 A. 840 (1919).
67 See Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U.S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354 (1935).
68 Ruddy's Estate, 236 Pa. 276, 84 A. 909 (1912).
69 Kates' Estate, 282 Pa. 417, 128 A. 97 (1925).
70 Horner's Estate, 4 Pa. C. C. 189 (1887); Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on
Lives & Granting Annuities Account, 264 Pa. 433, 107 A. 840 (1919).
nsee dicta in Hagen's Estate, 285 Pa. 326 at 331, 132 A. 175 (1926), to the
effect that "the real test [for blending] is whether the testator has treated the two
estates as one for all purposes and manifested an intent to commingle them generally."
(Italics added.) This was cited with approval in regard to another tax matter. See also
Valentine's Estate, 297 Pa. 99, 146 A. 453 (1929), where again no blending was
found.
72 201 Pa. 592, 51 A. 356 (1902).
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appoint was allowed to defeat, despite the facts that he had thereby
made his estate insolvent and that he appointed to volunteers. But on
the other hand the courts are not necessarily prevented from doing
whatever equity they see fit to recognize. If nothing else appears
clearly, the proposition that Pennsylvania authorities can be literally
construed in favor of creditors, where a testamentary exercise of a
power is found, deserves consideration. The fact that they most often
ar_e not is a matter for its judges to take up with their collective conscience.
Three Ohio cases,73 spanning nearly one hundred years, indicate
quite strongly that Ohio _courts take very much the same view of the
rights of donees' creditors as is taken by the Pennsylvania courts. The
biending doctrine in its present form seems not to have been considered,
however, and an appointment expressly subject to debts is apparently
a condition to the recognition of creditors' claims.74
Kentucky authorities 75 present quite clearly its stand on these matters. The donee's intent will govern, as in Pennsylvania. The principle
is even carried to the point of allowing preferential appointments to
certain designated creditors, to the exclusion of the claims of undesignated creditors.76 Such a result is certainly consistent with the donee's
intent approach, but it can scarcely be reconciled with present-day
principles of insolvency law and the modern concept of a fraudulent
conveyance. Another interesting theoretical consistency appears in a
case refusing to allow creditors to reach appointive realty when a general power to appoint both personalty and realty was exercised only
with respect to the personalty. Courts agreeing with the Pennsylvania
approach to these problems would logically have to reach this result,
but courts concurring with the Massachusetts theory of creditors' rights
might well find that a power is indivisible; and if exercised at all must
be considered exercised in full. This holding in turn could result in the
first inroad on the rather mechanical distinction between the results
possible when the general power is exercised and when it is not exercised.
73
Donley's Admrs. v. Shields, 14 Ohio 359 (1846); Meehan v. Burr, Trustee,
58 Ohio St. 689, 51 N. E. 1099 (1898); Matter of Trust of Rowald, 65 Ohio App.
191, 29 N. E. (2d) 575 (1940).
74
Matter of Trust of Rowald, 65 Ohio App. 191, 29 N. E. (2d) 575 (1940),
where the court allowed creditors' claims in such a case, but did not discuss the principle of blending.
·
75
Boyce v. Waller, 39 Ky. 478 (1840); Payne v. Johnson's Exrs., 95 Ky. 175
(1893); Slayden v. Hardin, 257 Ky. 685, 79 S. W. (2d) l l (1935); St. Matthews
Bank v. De Charette, 259 Ky. 802, 83 S. W. (2d) 471 (1935); Godfroy v. De
Charette, 260 Ky. 147, 84 S. W. (2d) 66 (1935).
76
Godfroy v. De Charette, 260 Ky. 147, 84 S. W. (2d) 66 (1935).
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Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Anthony 11 appears to be the
only Rhode Island case on the subject. Since the donee's estate did not
there appear to have been insolvent, and since it was the donee's executor, anc;l not his creditors, who was making the claim for the appointed property, that part of the opinion discussing the rights of
donees' creditors in general was perhaps dictum, but nevertheless it is
so strong and so well considered that it may still be-a basis for saying
that, at least in the absence of a contrary expression of intent by either
the donor or the donee, appointive property is imp1une in Rhode Island
from the claims of donees' creditors.
The implication of the only two South Carolina cases conceivably in
point is that it is the donor's intent which must govern in deciding
whether creditors' claims can be recognized. 78 If this were so, South
Carolina would stand alone on the proposition. But in neither of these
cases is there any indication that the donees' estates were insolvent. It
is submitted that they cannot be taken too seriously, and that, at its
strictest, South Carolina would adopt the Pennsylvania view if the
problem arose.
In Maryland the predominant dicta are in favor of the Pennsylvania view,7° but there is one conspicuous exception. A power authorizing a donee to appoint generally by will appears in this state not to be
considered a general power. 80 The case proposing this interpretation
held, however, that there was involved no attempt to appoint to creditors. Thus, by this reading, all that was decided was that the donee's
intent is to some extent determinative. Subsequent Maryland cases are
not even this much in point,81 but the denial that a testamentary power
can be a general power within the meaning of a donees'-creditors rule
is repeated in dicta.82
The above analysis of cases which in fact decide anything relevant
to the rights of donees' creditors against property appointed by will discloses that, generally speaking, there are, under a given set of circum49 R. I. 339, 142 A. 531 (1928).
Humphrey v. Campbell, 59 S. C. 39, 37 S. E. 26 (1900); Adger v. Kirk,
116 S. C. 298, 108 S. E. 97 (1920).
79 Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 16 A. 16 {1888); Price v. Cherbonnier, 103
Md. 107, 63 A. 209 (1906).
80 Balls v. Dampman, 60 Md. 390, 16 A. 16 (1888).
81 Price v. Cherbonnier, 103 Md. 107, 63 A. 209 (1906), where the donee
of a testamentary power to appoint to children or descendants attempted to appoint to
the children of a third person; Prince de Beam v. Winans, II I Md. 434, 74 A. 626
(1909), where the real question involved was a problem in conflict of laws; Mercantile
Trust Co. v. Bergdorf & Goodman Co., 167 Md. 158, 173 A. 31 (1934), where the
donor and donee were the same person, and where the power was not exercised.
82 Price v. Cherbonnier, 103 Md. 107, 63 A. 209 (1906).
77
78
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stances, two partially conflicting approaches to the problem. In practice
the chief distinction is that. where on the one hand a court will look
solely to the solvency of a donee's estate before recognizing creditors'
claims, on the other it will loo~ also to a donee's intent as ~ressed in
the instrument exercising the power. Whether, on principle, the intent
of a donee should be the determinative factor in deciding whether or
not certain property should be used to satisfy his creditors generally, in
preference .to protecting appointees who may or may not have legal
claims against his estate, is a question which probably should be answered with an eye to the present broad theories of bankruptcy law.
Technical property concepts of the operation and effect of the exercise
-of a power of appointment must be weighed against the proposition that
a man will be made to use property for the payment of his just debts
before he can use it for any other selfish or philanthropic purpose. It is
submitted that those jurisdictions which are aligned with Pennsylvania
and consider principally the donee's intent have either failed to see this
as the ultimate problem or, having seen it, have inconsistently conceded the greater weight to property-law technicalities. What will be
accomplished by juridical decision in the future is quite uncertain, particularly in view of the fact that recent cases seem rather to revitalize
old ones than to show a distinguishable trend in any particular direction.
It would appear that in those jurisdictions where the courts are already
committed_ to one of the two approaches, any sharp change which may
seem desirable will have to be accomplished chiefly through legislative
action.
Charles Wright, Ill*
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